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INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas wells in Louisiana are often located in remote areas, far 
from population centers; but, sometimes, the best location for a well is in 
an area subject to zoning regulations enacted by a city or parish. These 
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zoning regulations may prohibit drilling or impose requirements greater 
than those imposed under state law. Such circumstances set the stage for a 
possible confrontation between Louisiana’s police power—which 
includes the Office of Conservation’s exclusive power to issue drilling 
permits—and the power of the city or parish to enact land use ordinances 
for the health and welfare of its residents.
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution, statutes, and case law indicate that 
in the event of such a confrontation, the state’s police power should trump 
the city’s or parish’s ordinances. This means that an operator that holds a 
valid drilling permit issued by the Office of Conservation should be able 
to drill its well at the location specified in the permit, and municipal and 
parochial authorities should not be able to prevent drilling or impose 
additional requirements on the operator. 
This Article reviews the history of the Louisiana Office of 
Conservation and outlines the parameters of its jurisdiction over oil and 
gas drilling in Louisiana granted by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution and 
its predecessor, the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, to carry out a mandate to 
conserve Louisiana’s natural resources. In addition, it addresses the
powers and authority of the Commissioner, both generally and in the 
specific context of drilling permits issued pursuant to Title 30 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes. The Article also discusses the dignity of 
municipal and parochial land use ordinances under the 1974 Louisiana 
Constitution and explores how courts have resolved the tension between 
the state’s police power and local governments’ zoning authority in the 
context of drilling for oil and gas.
I. THE COMMISSIONER’S PLENARY AUTHORITY
A. Purpose and Powers of the Office of Conservation
1. Prevention of Waste of Oil or Gas
Chapter 1 (“Commissioner of Conservation”) of Subtitle I (“Minerals, 
Oil and Gas”) of Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes sets forth the 
purpose and powers of the Office of Conservation in general terms. 
Section 1 of Title 30 establishes the “Department” (in common parlance 
referred to as the “Office”) of Conservation, which is a subordinate part of 
the cabinet-level Department of Natural Resources. The Commissioner 
“direct[s] and control[s]” the Office of Conservation, which has 
jurisdiction over “[a]ll natural resources of the state not within the 
jurisdiction of other state departments or agencies,” and over “[t]he 
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disposal of any waste product into the subsurface by means of a disposal 
well. . . .”1
Section 2 of Title 30, in effect a prelude to section 4, states simply, 
“[W]aste of oil or gas as defined in this chapter is prohibited.” In section 
4, the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and his duties and powers are set 
forth in detail. The section begins with a broad, general grant of authority2
and continues with specific grants of authority to conduct “such inquiries 
as [the Commissioner] thinks proper,” and, after notice and hearing, to 
promulgate “any reasonable rules, regulations, and orders that are 
necessary from time to time” in the exercise of his powers.3 Paragraph C 
of section 4 then lists some of the purposes for which the Commissioner 
may promulgate rules, regulations, or orders, which include: prevention of 
intrusion of water into oil or gas strata; plugging and abandoning of wells, 
site clearance, and posting of bonds for same; filing of drilling reports, 
logs, and electrical surveys; fixing of gas-oil ratios; secondary recovery 
methods; prorating production in order to prevent waste; spacing and 
establishment of drilling units; saltwater disposal wells; and construction, 
design, and operation of carbon dioxide pipelines serving secondary and 
tertiary recovery projects.4
2. General Authority and Specific Powers
The evolution of the Commissioner’s powers, from the establishment 
of the Office of Conservation in the 1921 Louisiana Constitution to the 
detailed listing of specific powers in Title 30 of the Revised Statutes, was 
explained in 1957 by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Delatte v. Woods.5
In that case, near the end of a mineral lease’s two-year primary term, the 
lessee had obtained from the lessors an amendment that (i) allowed the 
lease to be extended for up to an additional year without drilling, by means 
of monthly $1,000 payments and, (ii) assuming a well was spudded within 
the one-year extended period, then required the payment of $500 per 
month after spudding until production was obtained. 
The lessee paid the $1,000 payments for ten months then began 
tendering $500 monthly payments, which the lessors rejected. The lessee’s 
theory justifying the reduced post-spudding monthly payments was that a 
                                                                                                            
1. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 30:1(A), 1(C), 1(D).
2. “Jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property necessary to 
enforce effectively the provisions of this Chapter . . . .” Id. § 30:4(A).
3. Id. §§ 30:4(B)-(C).
4. Id. §§ 30:4(C)(1)(a)(ii), 4(C)(1)(a)(iv), 4(C)(2), 4(C)(5), 4(C)(10), 
4(C)(11), 4(C)(13), 4(C)(16)(a), 4(C)(17)(a).
5. Delatte v. Woods, 94 So. 2d 281 (La. 1957).
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well had been drilled on adjacent lands not owned by the lessors, and some 
of the lessors’ lands were included in the drilling unit6 served by this well.7
The lessee reasoned that the language of the extension together with the 
pooling clause allowed the lessee to treat the off-site unit well as the well 
contemplated by the extension. The lessor disagreed, filed suit, and 
prevailed at the district court, which awarded among other remedies the 
cancellation of the lease and attorney’s fees.8
The Louisiana Supreme Court, addressing whether the Commissioner’s 
unitization order including part of the lessors’ lands in the unit had the 
incidental effect of maintaining the lease, explained the history and purpose 
of the Office of Conservation. The 1921 Louisiana Constitution created the 
Office “for the sole purpose of protecting, conserving and replenishing the 
natural resources of this State. . . .”9 Pursuant to this constitutional authority, 
the legislature, in Act No. 157 of 1940, enacted Title 30 in the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, which the Court described as:
a comprehensive conservation statute, giving the Commissioner the 
authority, among other things, to prohibit the waste of oil and gas 
and to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells by integrating into 
drilling units the maximum area he finds, as a fact, one well can 
efficiently and economically drain.10
The Court, applying the quoted portion of Title 30, described how to 
resolve the tension between an individual’s contractual rights and the 
State’s police power. The Court’s language foreshadowed a conflict that 
would occur thirty-seven years later11 between local zoning ordinances 
and the state’s police power: “[I]ndividual and property rights and 
contractual relations must yield to a proper exercise of the police power; 
and it is in the light of this principle that such laws [as Title 30] are 
                                                                                                            
6. According to LA. REV. STAT. § 30:9(B), the Commissioner is required to 
establish drilling units “[f]or the prevention of waste and to avoid the drilling of 
unnecessary wells. . . .” A drilling unit is “the maximum area which may be 
efficiently and economically drained by the well or wells designated to serve the 
drilling unit as the unit well. . . .” Id. The location of the well for the drilling unit 
is designated by the Commissioner. Id. § 9(C).
7. The pooling clause in the lease provided that the inclusion of any part of 
the leased lands in a unit served by an offsite unit well would maintain the lease 
as to all of the covered lands. 
8. Delatte, 94 So. 2d at 286.
9. Id. (quoting Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod. Co., 
60 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. 1952)).
10. Id. at 286-87 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 30:2 et seq).
11. In City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237 (La. 1994).
2019] STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF DRILLING IN LOUISIANA 319
recognized as constitutionally valid.”12 Accordingly, the Delatte Court
held that, because part of the leased acreage was included in the unit served 
by the offsite well, the lessee was relieved of any drilling obligation, and 
the well maintained the portion of the leased premises outside the unit as 
well as the portion inside the unit.13
Almost thirty years after Delatte, another unitization dispute provided 
the Louisiana Supreme Court with a teaching moment regarding the effect 
of the Commissioner’s unitization powers on private property rights. In 
Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., the plaintiff’s unleased property had 
been included (as he had urged during the unitization hearing) in a unit.14
The unit operator obtained a drilling permit, which sited the unit well on 
leased property within the unit, adjacent to the plaintiff’s unleased 
property also within the unit.15
When the well was actually drilled, however, it was located one foot 
to the north and twenty-two feet to the west of the permitted site, which 
crowded the plaintiff’s property line. (The drilling permit was later 
amended to allow for this changed location.) The well bottomed at 11,730 
feet, and a directional survey showed that the bottom hole location, and as 
much as 750 feet of the well bore, was underneath the plaintiff’s 
property.16 Notwithstanding (i) that the bottom hole location was more 
than two miles below the surface of his property, (ii) that his earlier plea 
that his property be included in the unit, and (iii) that he would receive his 
proportionate share of the proceeds of unit production, the plaintiff 
nonetheless sued the unit operator, other property owners within the unit, 
and the Commissioner of Conservation, alleging that the intrusion of the 
well bore beneath his property constituted a trespass.17
The plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiring the unit operator 
to remove the well bore and moved for summary judgment. In response, 
the defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment based on the 
Commissioner’s authority and duty to designate the unit well. The district 
court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted the defendants’ motions, 
affirming the Commissioner’s earlier refusal to order the removal of the 
well bore and the right of the defendants to continue to operate the well.18
On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the 
dismissal of the Commissioner from the suit but held that his unitization 
                                                                                                            
12. Delatte, 94 So. 2d at 287.
13. Id. at 288.
14. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986).
15. Id. at 957.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 958.
18. Id.
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order “did not and could not authorize drilling on or under unleased 
property without the consent of the landowner.”19 The First Circuit 
therefore reinstated the plaintiff’s case and remanded it to the district court 
for a determination of whether a subsurface trespass had occurred and, if 
so, whether it was in good faith or bad faith. The First Circuit reasoned 
that, if bad faith were found, the defendants could be ordered to remove 
the encroachment and pay damages.20
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the defendants’ application for 
a writ of certiorari. The Court noted that article 490 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code states that the ownership of land carries with it the ownership of 
everything beneath, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law.”21 The Court 
framed the issue before it as “whether the formation of a compulsory unit, 
as permitted in La. Rev. Stat. 30:10, affects the generally applicable 
principles concerning ownership of property and/or alters the concept of 
trespass beneath the surface owner’s tract.”22
The Court’s analysis and resolution of this issue, authored by Justice 
Calogero, is scholarly and thorough. The Court began its analysis by 
tracing the legal history of oil and gas exploration in Louisiana, noting that 
drive mechanisms in underground reservoirs were poorly understood in 
the early days of oil and gas exploration, when it was thought that “oil 
flowed in underground rivers and an analogy was seen between the 
ownership of oil and the ownership of water and animals which traverse 
one’s property.”23 This led to what is known as the “rule of capture,” 
defined as:
a rule of law (sometimes called a rule of convenience) arising from 
ownership of property, or the right to produce oil and gas, by 
virtue of which an operator who drills on his own land, or land 
held under an oil and gas lease or other instrument, acquires title 
to the oil which he legally produces from the well, whether or not 
drainage takes place from surrounding properties.24
                                                                                                            
19. Id.
20. Nunez, 488 So. 2d. at 958.
21. Id. at 959 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 490).
22. Nunez, 488 So. 2d. at 959.
23. Id. at 960.
24. Id. (quoting HARRIET DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA, at 419-
21 (1949)).
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As a predictable consequence of Louisiana’s adoption of the rule of capture, 
the ensuing period was characterized by “haste, inefficient operations, and 
immeasurable waste within the ground and above.”25 The Court elaborated:
[W]ithout the power to regulate or control conditions in an 
oilfield, the temptation to acquire quick riches might easily 
produce an intolerable situation in drilling indiscriminately upon 
any size or shape of tract sufficient to permit derrick operations, 
resulting in waste and exhaustion of underground energy 
consisting of natural gas, etc. and ultimately restricting recovery, 
involving useless expenditures by operators and preventing some, 
if not all, from recovering their investments.26
Over time, the Louisiana legislature remedied this situation in a series of 
acts:
a. 1906 La. Acts No. 71: Following a natural gas blowout in the 
Caddo Field in north Louisiana, the legislature made it a criminal 
offense to negligently permit a gas well to burn wastefully.
b. 1908 La. Acts No. 144: The legislature created a Board of 
Commissioners, which it authorized to investigate and report on 
the condition of the natural resources of the state. 
c. 1924 La. Acts Nos. 252 and 253: The first all-inclusive statutes 
for gas and oil were enacted, and the principle of co-ownership in 
a common source of supply, proportionate to ownership of the 
surface, was recognized.
d. 1936 La. Acts No. 225: A comprehensive statute, modeled after 
New Mexico’s law, regulated the spacing of wells and authorized 
compulsory unitization. This legislation failed, both because it did 
not define “waste” and because its procedural articles proved 
inadequate.
e. 1940 La. Acts No. 157: This law completely revised existing 
legislation, embodying the best features of New Mexico and 
Arkansas law. “This act, as amended, constitutes Louisiana’s 
basic conservation law with respect to the oil and gas industry.”27
Having thus reviewed the history of oil and gas legislation in Louisiana in 
order to provide context, the Court turned its attention to the issue before 
it. In the Court’s mind, the formation of the unit effectively disposed of 
                                                                                                            
25. Nunez, 488 So. 2d. at 960.
26. Id. (quoting Lilly v. Conserv. Comm’rs, 29 F.Supp. 892, 897 (E.D. La. 
1939)).
27. Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 961.
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the plaintiff’s trespass claim. According to Mire v. Hawkins, unitization, 
whether compulsory or voluntary, departs from traditional notions of 
private property and converts separate interests within the drilling unit into 
a common interest, with regard to unit drilling and development.28
Although the plaintiff owned the surface, pursuant to article 6 of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code29 he did not own the oil and gas underneath, only 
the right to explore and develop. 
This right to explore and develop one’s property, according to the 
Louisiana Constitution, “is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and 
the reasonable exercise of police power.”30 In the case before the Court, 
these restrictions took the form of the Commissioner’s unitization order. 
Moreover, the plaintiff’s right to explore and develop his property was 
further circumscribed by the correlative rights of the other unit owners, 
who together with the plaintiff co-owned interests in a common 
reservoir.31 Having already noted that the plaintiff suffered no damages, 
as he would receive his proportionate share of production from the unit, 
the Court relied on these principles to hold that no trespass had occurred.32
The Court accordingly reversed the court of appeal and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s suit. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court again examined the Commissioner of 
Conservation’s power and authority in a unitization context eight years 
later in Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor.33 In that case, following hearings, the 
Office of Conservation dissolved certain units and created two new units, 
which excluded some formerly-included acreage and included some 
formerly-excluded acreage. The orders when issued were made effective 
ninety-six days earlier, when the hearings concluded.34 In the interim, 
production had been allocated pursuant to the old, superseded units, so 
                                                                                                            
28. Mire v. Hawkins, 186 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1966).
29. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (“Ownership of land does not include ownership 
of oil, gas and other minerals. . . . The landowner has the exclusive right to explore 
and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them 
to possession and ownership.”).
30. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1974).
31. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:9-10 (“Landowners and others with rights in a 
common reservoir or deposit of minerals have correlative rights and duties with 
respect to one another in the development and production of the common source of 
minerals . . . . A person with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals 
may not make works, operate, or otherwise use his rights so as to deprive another 
intentionally or negligently of the liberty of enjoying his rights, or that may 
intentionally or negligently cause damage to him. . . .”).
32. Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 964.
33. Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191 (La. 1994).
34. Id. at 194.
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that, when the new unitization orders issued, automatically some unit 
owners were underproduced35 and some were overproduced.36 There was 
no gas balancing agreement or joint operating agreement in effect between 
the overproduced and underproduced parties to address the imbalance.37
The underproduced parties therefore applied to the Commissioner for 
an order requiring the overproduced parties to remedy the imbalance by 
means of a cash accounting. The overproduced parties opposed the 
request, arguing for a correction of the imbalance by production over time, 
referred to as balancing in kind. After a hearing, the Commissioner ordered 
balancing in kind, which evidence showed would require approximately 
twenty-two months.38
Disappointed with the Commissioner’s order, the underproduced 
parties filed suit in the 19th Judicial District Court in Baton Rouge, which 
has exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review of the Commissioner’s 
orders.39 The Commissioner and the overproduced parties defended the 
Commissioner’s order, but the district court reversed the order and ordered 
cash balancing. The Louisiana Supreme Court, “[r]ecognizing the 
importance of stability and predictability in the oil and gas industry in 
Louisiana,”40 granted the Commissioner’s and the overproduced parties’ 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The Court’s decision, which carefully considered unit production 
balancing issues, bears upon the Commissioner’s preemptive powers over 
drilling in two important respects: It affirmed the primacy of the 
Commissioner’s authority over conservation matters—an issue of inherent 
statewide concern—and provided guidance to lower courts on the standard 
of review applicable to the Commissioner’s fact finding and conclusions. 
On the first issue, the primacy of the Commissioner’s authority, the Court 
said, “[T]he authority and responsibility for conserving Louisiana’s oil and 
gas resources are virtually entirely vested in the office of the Commissioner 
of Conservation. . . .”41 On the second issue, emphasizing the deference that 
courts owe agency actions, the court stated, “The manifest error test . . . is 
used in reviewing the facts as found by the agency, as opposed to the 
arbitrariness test used in reviewing conclusions and exercises of agency 
                                                                                                            
35. These had received less than their allocable share of production under the 
new unit orders.
36. These had received more than their allocable share of production under 
the new unit orders.
37. Id.
38. Hunt Oil Co., 644 So. 2d at 195 & n.8.
39. Pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. § 30:12 (2017).
40. Hunt Oil Co., 644 So. 2d at 196.
41. Id. at 197.
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discretion.”42 The court explained the “manifest error” test and the 
“arbitrariness” test as follows:
[T]he Commissioner’s findings of fact are entitled to great weight 
by a reviewing court and, unless manifestly erroneous or clearly 
wrong, should not be reversed. . . . Furthermore, in reviewing the 
conclusions and exercises of agency discretion by the 
Commissioner, the reviewing court must apply the arbitrariness 
test, and the party challenging the Commissioner’s decision must 
make a clear showing that the administrative action was arbitrary 
and capricious. . . . It is fundamental that the district court must not 
weigh de novo the evidence presented to the Commissioner and 
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.43
Applying these principles, the Court chided the First Circuit for 
substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner44 and reinstated the 
Commissioner’s order directing balancing in kind.45
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Delatte, Nunez, and Batchelor
recognized that conservation of resources and prevention of waste are 
inherently matters of statewide concern. These concerns, which in those 
cases arose in a unitization context, are also profoundly impacted by 
drilling rules and regulations. This suggests that the drilling statutes in 
Title 30 and the drilling regulations in Statewide Order No. 29-B should 
preempt municipal and parochial zoning and land use ordinances that 
would prohibit or make more burdensome drilling activities that have been 
permitted by the Office of Conservation.
B. Drilling Permits and Procedure
1. In General: La. Rev. Stat. § 30:28
The steps in the permitting process are set forth in section 28 of Title 
30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. Under subsection A, a drilling permit 
is required before any well or test well may be drilled, and under 
subsection B(1) and (2), the permit is valid for either six months or a year 
                                                                                                            
42. Id. at 199 (quoting Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control 
Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1159 (La. 1984)).
43. Id. at 200 (citing Save Ourselves; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 
566 So. 2d 138, 145 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 627 (La. 1990)).
44. Id. at 204 (“[T]he court of appeal improperly substituted its judgment for 
that of the Commissioner when it held that balancing in kind would take an 
‘inordinate’ amount of time.”).
45. Id. at 205.
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from its issuance. No permit to drill a well or test well will issue until the 
applicant satisfies the conditions of subsection D: 
(1) The application for the permit must be accompanied by a 
location plat, certified by a professional land surveyor, which 
shows the proposed well site in relation to the surrounding 
property within a 500-foot radius.
(2), (3) If a residential or commercial structure not owned by the
applicant or his lessor or a predecessor in interest is located within 
the 500-foot radius, the Commissioner notifies the owners of any 
such structure and the local governing authority, and also notifies 
them of a public hearing about the proposed well. 
(4), (5), (6) Any notified property owner or local governing 
authority may request a public hearing about whether the permit 
should issue. The request must be made within ten days of the 
mailing of the Commissioner’s notice. If a hearing is requested, it 
“shall” be held, affording property owners and local government 
representatives the opportunity to be heard. The permit will not 
issue until the public hearing is concluded and the Commissioner 
has considered comments and information presented at the 
hearing.
(7), (8) If the certified location plat does not show any residential 
or commercial structure not owned by the applicant, his lessor or 
other predecessor in interest within the 500-foot radius of the 
proposed well site, the permit will issue. Workover rigs are 
exempt from the provisions of subsection D.
Subsection E of section 28 exempts applicants for permits for wells less 
than 10,000 feet deep from complying with subsection D. Subsection F is 
strong evidence of the legislature’s intent that the Commissioner’s 
authority over drilling be preemptive. The point is made emphatically and 
repeatedly:
The issuance of the permit by the Commissioner of Conservation 
shall be sufficient authorization to the holder of the permit to enter 
upon the property covered by the permit and to drill in search of 
minerals thereon. No other agency or political subdivision of the 
state shall have the authority, and they are hereby expressly 
forbidden, to prohibit or in any way interfere with the drilling of 
a well or test well in search of minerals by the holder of such a 
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permit.46
Subsection G of section 28 directs the Commissioner to promulgate rules, 
regulations and orders regarding an operator’s certification of the quality 
of surface water intended to be used in drilling operations. This directive 
is meant to “ensure ground water aquifer safety.”47
2. In Particular: Statewide Order No. 29-B
The Commissioner’s regulations governing permitting and procedures 
for drilling are codified in Statewide Order No. 29-B, Part XIX of Title 43 
of the Louisiana Administrative Code, at section 101 and following.48
Section 103, in subsection C, repeats the prohibition in La. Rev. Stat.
section 30:28(A) against drilling before a permit has issued. Subsection C 
goes on to provide that if the applicant performs some predrilling work 
before the permit issues, such as digging pits or erecting buildings or 
derricks, it does so at its own risk. Detailed requirements governing 
signage for wells appear in subsection E of section 103. 
Section 104 addresses financial security to be posted by permit 
applicants. According to subsection A of section 104, the purpose of 
financial security for a well is “in order to ensure that such well is plugged 
and abandoned and associated site restoration is accomplished.” Pursuant to 
subsection B, financial security may be in the form of a certificate of deposit, 
a performance bond, a letter of credit, or a site-specific trust account. 
Section 105 of Title 43 of the Administrative Code states that permits 
are required for several kinds of post-drilling repair operations, including 
operations to plug and abandon, acidize, deepen, perforate, squeeze, 
sidetrack, pull casing, and rework wells. Section 107, dealing with records, 
requires that electrical logs be sent to the Office of Conservation within 
ten days after completion. Requirements for casing programs, blowout 
preventers, and casing heads are set forth in sections 109, 111, and 113, 
respectively. 
Section 115 contains detailed requirements for the mitigation of fire 
hazards, and section 117 permits Conservation inspectors and engineers to 
inspect mud records and to test mud and other drilling fluids. If “conditions 
and tests indicate a need for a change in the mud or drilling fluid program 
in order to ensure proper control of the well,” the Conservation district 
manager “shall” require the operator to correct the problem. Section 119 
addresses well allowables and completions; section 121, production, 
                                                                                                            
46. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:28(F) (2000) (emphasis added).
47. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:28(G) (2000). 
48. LA. ADMIN. CODE § 43:XIX (2017).
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production records and production tests; and section 123, oil and gas 
measurements. Bottom-hole pressure surveys are addressed in section 127, 
and directional drilling and well surveys are addressed in section 135. End-
of-life plugging and abandonment requirements are set forth in section 137.
The legislature’s allocation of authority to the Commissioner in La. 
Rev. Stat. section 30:4, the step-wise permitting procedure set forth in La. 
Rev. Stat. section 30:28 (especially the preemptive language in subsection 
F), and the Commissioner’s comprehensive, cradle-to-grave regulations in 
Statewide Order No. 29-B are all strong indications of an intent to preempt 
contrary municipal or parochial zoning or land use ordinances. The issue 
is not entirely free from doubt, however, because of the constitutional 
underpinnings of some local entities’ self-governance rights.
III. LOCAL LAND USE AND ZONING ORDINANCES
A. Home Rule Charters: First Class, Second Class, or None
Cases where local land use or zoning ordinances conflict with state 
statutes governing the drilling of oil and gas wells have required the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to balance the state’s police power against the 
local entity’s right to govern itself in matters of local interest. The 
resolution of the tension between these two concerns includes a 
consideration of whether the parish or city has enacted a home rule charter, 
which in effect is a mini-constitution for the entity’s governance over local 
issues. Entities that have home rule charters generally have all powers not 
expressly withheld by the state’s constitution or statutory laws: “[A] home 
rule charter government possesses, in affairs of local concern, powers 
which within its jurisdiction are as broad as that of the state, except when 
limited by the constitution, laws permitted by the constitution, or its own 
home rule charter.”49 Conversely, if the local entity does not have a home 
rule charter, it is regarded as a subordinate creature of the state, able to 
exercise only those powers expressly granted by the state’s constitution or 
statutes: “A police jury in this state is a creature and subordinate political 
subdivision of the state and as such only possesses those powers conferred 
by the state’s constitution and statutes.”50
A further distinction exists between different types of home rule 
entities, favoring those whose home rule charters were in effect prior to 
the enactment of the 1974 Constitution. These “first class” home rule 
                                                                                                            
49. Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168, 1171 (La. 1984).
50. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 
So. 2d 1127, 1131 (La. 1979) (citing LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7(A)).
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charter entities are free to enact local laws except where such action is 
forbidden by the constitution:
[U]nless a legislative act by a preexisting home rule government
exceeds some limit placed upon its power of initiation by the 1974 
Constitution, that government’s power of immunity prevents the 
legislature from reversing, withdrawing, or denying an exercise 
by that city or parish of its power to enact and enforce that local 
law.51
On the other hand, if the local entity did not enact its home rule charter 
until after the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, it is a “second class”52
home rule charter entity, free to enact local laws except where such action 
is forbidden by the constitution or state statutes:
[L]ocal governmental subdivisions that acquire[d] home rule 
powers after the adoption of the constitution do not enjoy the same 
degree of immunity from control by the legislature. Article VI, 
section 5 [of the 1974 Constitution] authorizes any such local 
governmental subdivision to adopt a home rule charter providing 
for the exercise of any power “necessary, requisite, or proper for 
the management of its affairs, not denied by general law or 
inconsistent with this constitution.”53
These distinctions in different entities’ powers to initiate local laws and 
their immunities from state “interference” may be important in cases 
pitting the holder of a drilling permit against an entity trying to enforce its 
zoning regulations. Two Louisiana Supreme Court cases, though not 
involving drilling permits, illustrate this point.
B. State Police Power v. Local Ordinances
In Rollins Envtl. Serv. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police 
Jury, the plaintiff (“Rollins”) entered into a purchase and sale agreement 
for a deep well disposal facility and the surrounding twenty acres in 
Iberville Parish.54 The Office of Conservation thereupon approved the 
transfer of the seller’s operating permit to Rollins. Shortly after the closing 
                                                                                                            
51. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 245-46 (La. 
1994) (emphasis added).
52. “First class” and “second class” are the author’s designations.
53. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 246 (emphasis added).
54. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 
So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979).
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of the sale, however, Iberville Parish, acting through its police jury, 
amended an ordinance to prohibit the disposal of “hazardous waste” 
anywhere in the parish.55
Rollins promptly filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and 
to have it declared unconstitutional. The district court denied the injunction 
and held that the amended ordinance was constitutional; but the Louisiana 
First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed.56 The Louisiana Supreme Court then 
granted the parish’s application for a writ of certiorari. The parish argued 
that it was statutorily entitled to amend its ordinance, relying on La. Rev. 
Stat. sections 33:1236(16) and (31) which, respectively, authorized police 
juries to enact ordinances to protect against contagious diseases and to 
regulate trash and garbage disposal. The parish also argued that the state had 
not legislatively preempted the field.57
The Court first noted the subordinate political status of a police jury 
under article VI, section 7(A) of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, in that the 
police jury possesses “only . . . those powers conferred by the state’s 
constitution and statutes.”58 Next, examining the statutes supposedly 
authorizing the parish’s action, the Court noted that subsection (16) of La.
Rev. Stat. 33:1236 allowed only ordinances that were “not inconsistent with 
the laws and constitution of the United States, nor of this state.” This same 
limitation did not appear in subsection (31), but the Court held that the 
limitation “has general application in our law and applies to subsection (31) 
by implication.”59 In other words, according to the Court, the authority of 
Iberville Parish to enact the amended ordinance was “dependent upon 
whether the state legislature has not enacted general laws on the same 
subject and thereby preempted that field of regulation.”60
This was an easy question for the Court to answer, because, in several 
statutory enactments, Louisiana had entirely preempted the field and 
delegated authority to the Office of Conservation within the Department of 
Natural Resources, and to the Department of Health and Human 
Resources.61 The Court accordingly affirmed the First Circuit’s declaration 
that the amended ordinance was unconstitutional, and, in language that 
could be applied to drilling permits, stated further: 
                                                                                                            
55. Id. at 1129-30.
56. Id. at 1130.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1131.
59. Rollins, 371 So. 2d at 1131.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1133; see also LA. REV. STAT. §§ 30:1(D), 3(1)(c), 3(15), 4C(16); 
30:1101-16; 40:5, 1299.36 (2018).
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[R]egulation of hazardous wastes is a matter of broad national and 
state concern. From a review of this legislation it is apparent that the 
matter is such that spotty municipal and parochial control would be 
ineffective. It is not difficult to conclude that if Iberville Parish is 
permitted to prohibit the disposal of industrial hazardous waste 
within its borders there will be, in short order, similar ordinances in 
every parish of the State. . . . Louisiana’s prominent position in 
industry makes it one of the Nation’s foremost producers of chemical 
and other industrial waste classified as hazardous. As such it cries out 
[sic] against the prospect of such a stifling prohibition.62
In 1994, the Louisiana Supreme Court again addressed a conflict between 
Louisiana’s police power and a local ordinance. This time, however, the 
local entity was not a subordinate and dependent police jury but was 
instead a “first class” home rule charter city, whose charter predated the 
1974 Louisiana Constitution. In City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs,
the Board of the former Orleans Levee District proposed to build a marina 
and related developments for commercial profit on state-owned land
inside the city of New Orleans without complying with New Orleans’ 
zoning and building ordinances.63 The city sued for a declaratory judgment 
and an injunction prohibiting the levee district’s violation of the city’s 
ordinances, but the trial court and the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeal decided:
[T]he [city] could not enforce its zoning and building laws against 
the [levee district], observing that a state statute enabling [the 
levee district’s] land development activities constituted an 
exercise of the state police power that superseded the [city’s] 
constitutional home rule powers of legislation and regulation.64
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the city’s petition for certiorari, and 
after setting forth some history of the tension between home rule and state 
police powers in Louisiana and other states, noted the city’s status as a 
“preexisting home rule municipality”65 and proceeded to examine the 
city’s charter. This examination persuaded the Court that New Orleans 
“stakes a continuing claim, without self-imposed limits, to the utmost 
                                                                                                            
62. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of Louisiana, 371 So. 2d at 1132.
63. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 237 (La. 1994).
64. Id. at 241.
65. Id. at 243.
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powers of initiation available to the city under the constitution.”66 The 
Court was convinced on this point:
[T]he . . . home rule charter asserts, and article VI, section 4 of the 
constitution authorizes the city to exercise, any legislative power 
within its boundaries that is not inconsistent with the 1974 
constitution. 
The power to enact and enforce zoning and building laws plainly 
falls within the [city’s] home rule power to initiate legislation and 
regulation. . . . The exercise of this police power to regulate land 
use by the [city] as part of its retained home rule legislative power 
is not generically inconsistent with any provision of the 
constitution. In fact, the zoning power of the [city] is positively 
confirmed by article VI, section 17 of the constitution, which 
authorizes local governmental subdivisions to adopt regulations 
for land use, zoning, and historic preservation. In view of the 
foregoing, we conclude that the [city’s] home rule powers include 
the authority to adopt and enforce zoning and building ordinances 
within the city boundaries.67
Having concluded that New Orleans had the authority to initiate zoning 
and building ordinances, the Court next examined whether the city was 
immune from any attempt by the legislature to withdraw or deny the city’s 
power to enforce the ordinances. The Court held that the city was immune, 
as long as it did not exceed the constitutional limitations on its power:
[T]he legislature may not control, restrain or override a 
preexisting home rule government’s valid exercise of the power 
to initiate legislation that is consistent with the constitution. 
Accordingly, unless a legislative act by a preexisting home rule 
government exceeds some limit placed upon its power of initiation 
by the 1974 constitution, that government’s power of immunity 
prevents the legislature from reversing, withdrawing or denying 
an exercise by that city or parish of its power to enact and enforce 
that local law.68
New Orleans therefore had both the power to initiate its building and 
zoning ordinances and immunity from any attempt by the legislature 
statutorily to supersede them, provided the ordinances did not impinge 
                                                                                                            
66. Id. at 245.
67. Id. (citing 1974 LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, 17).
68. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 245-46.
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upon the state’s police power. The Court again turned to the 1974 
constitution to address this third and final issue.
The Court noted that article VI, section 9(B) of the 1974 constitution 
provides, ambiguously, that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this 
Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged.” According 
to the Court, the purpose of this provision was to harmonize local 
governments’ home rule powers with the state’s power “to initiate 
legislation and regulation necessary to protect and promote the vital 
interests of its people as a whole.”69 The Court would consider this police 
power abridged only “when a local government’s conflicting law or 
ordinance would prevent the state from initiating action through its 
legislative branch necessary to promote or to protect the health, safety, 
welfare, or morality of the state as a whole.”70 The Court then explained 
the presumptions that must be overcome and the burden of proof that must 
be carried by a litigant claiming that the state’s police power had been 
abridged:
Article VI of the 1974 Louisiana constitution adopts a new 
philosophy of the state-local government relationship and strikes 
a balance in favor of home rule that calls for a corresponding 
adjustment in judicial attitude. . . . Consequently, home rule 
abilities and immunities are to be broadly construed, and any 
claimed exception to them must be given careful scrutiny by the 
courts. . . . [A] litigant claiming that a home rule municipality’s 
local law abridges the police power of the state must show that the 
local law conflicts with an act of the state legislature that is 
necessary to protect the vital interest of the state as a whole. To 
establish that the conflict actually exists, the litigant must show 
that the state statute and the ordinance are incompatible and 
cannot be effectuated in harmony. Further, to demonstrate that the 
state statute is “necessary” it must be shown that the protection of 
such state interest cannot be achieved through alternate means 
significantly less detrimental to home rule powers and rights.71
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the city did have the power to 
enforce its building and zoning ordinances on the levee district’s 
construction project within the city’s boundaries, reversing the court of 
appeal.72
                                                                                                            
69. Id. at 249.
70. Id. at 250.
71. Id. at 252 (citing Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d at 1173).
72. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 257.
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Rollins and City of New Orleans are at opposite ends of the spectrum 
of judicial deference to local enactments. The cases suggest that the holder 
of a drilling permit issued pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. section 30:28 may 
have a harder time in litigation against a preexisting home rule charter 
entity than it will against a police jury. However, neither a police jury nor 
a preexisting home rule charter entity may legislate on other than purely 
local matters. The regulation of drilling for oil and gas wells does seem a 
matter of compelling statewide concern, which should not be subjected to 
“spotty municipal and parochial control.”73
C. Preemption of the Permitting Process
Three Louisiana appellate courts and the United States Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed local ordinances’ conflicts with Louisiana’s 
police power in an oil and gas context. The courts in these cases did not 
rely on the constitutional distinction between home rule charter entities 
and police juries as a basis for their reasoning. This seems appropriate, 
because no local entity may legislate on matters of statewide concern, 
which are the exclusive province of the state legislature. The cases support 
an argument that Louisiana has preempted the field of oil and gas drilling 
by means of its statutes and regulations.
1. Traver: Concurrent Jurisdiction?
In Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Traver Oil Co., the 
holder of a mineral lease on state-owned water bottoms in Lake 
Pontchartrain obtained a drilling permit from the Office of Conservation 
and a coastal use permit from the Coastal Management Division of the 
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), which allowed it to drill a well 
1,338 feet away from the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway.74 The Greater 
New Orleans Expressway Commission sought a rehearing, which the 
DNR denied, and then sued for an injunction to prohibit the permitted well 
or any other well within one mile of the causeway. The district court 
entered judgment allowing the drilling to occur at the permitted site, 
subject to specified conditions, and the Commission appealed.75
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal framed the issue as 
whether the district court had erred “in allowing drilling activity and oil 
production activity within one mile of the [causeway] because such 
                                                                                                            
73. Rollins, 371 So. 2d at 1132.
74. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Traver Oil Co., 494 So. 2d 
1204, 1205 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 1206.
334 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
activity presents a direct and serious threat to public safety and welfare.”76
The lessee argued that the Commission had no right of action for an 
injunction, citing La. Rev. Stat. section 30:204(F)77 and section 30:218. 
This latter statute provides in part that “[n]o injunction shall issue against 
lessees of the state or state employees to restrain exploration for minerals 
on state lands.” Without explaining its reasoning or citing any authority, 
the court of appeal rejected the lessee’s argument:
The main purpose of these statutes is to prevent any state agencies 
other than the Department of Conservation from establishing other 
permit requirements applicable to those with a Department of 
Conservation permit. There is no prohibition in either of the above 
two sections which prohibit [sic] the issuance of an injunction to 
protect the public safety and welfare.78
The court of appeal next rejected another preclusion argument by the 
lessee, based on La. Rev. Stat. sections 30:204(D)(3) and (E).
Acknowledging that the well was not within 500 feet of any residential or 
commercial structure, the court pointed out that nevertheless the location 
was within the one-mile “prohibited zone” of the causeway as established 
by the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and held that “[a]ctivity 
within this area does present certain conditions and circumstances that 
must be properly addressed and must be controlled and restricted.”79
Accordingly, the court of appeal affirmed the district court’s admittedly 
well-considered judgments allowing drilling at the permitted site, subject 
to numerous operating conditions dictated by prudence and safety 
concerns.80
If misused as precedent, Traver could be an example of the axiom, 
“Hard cases make bad law.” The court in Traver did glide too quickly past 
the prohibitory language in section 204(F) (now section 28(F)) of Title 30 
of the Revised Statutes, but, as a practical matter, the result of the case 
does not offend. Section 28(D)(6) of Title 30 requires the Commissioner 
to consider comments and information presented at the hearing on whether 
a permit should issue. It appears that, in Traver the Commissioner could 
and should have conditioned the issuance of the permit upon compliance 
                                                                                                            
76. Id.
77. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:28(F) (2000).
78. Greater New Orleans Expressway, 494 So. 2d at 1207.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1209-15 (district court judgments attached to court of appeal’s 
opinion as Appendices A, B and C).
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with the same requirements imposed by the district court and affirmed by 
the court of appeal.
2. Desormeaux: Saltwater Disposal Wells
Four years after the Traver decision, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court 
of Appeal adjudicated a conflict between the Office of Conservation’s 
permitting process for saltwater disposal wells and a municipality’s 
ordinance banning such wells. In Desormeaux Enterprises, Inc. v. Village
of Mermentau, a company had purchased a tract of land within the 
corporate limits of the Village of Mermentau, intending to convert an 
abandoned oil well on the tract into a disposal well for brine produced in 
oil and gas exploration.81 The company published its notice of intention to 
apply to the Office of Conservation for an operating permit, whereupon 
Mermentau adopted an ordinance prohibiting the importation into the 
village of “any foreign material which is considered waste and must be 
disposed of, [such] as saltwater for injection into a subsurface well. . . .”82
In response to Mermentau’s “not in my back yard” ordinance, the 
plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional under Article VI, section 7(A) of the 1974 constitution 
and was unauthorized under Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. 
The district court held that the statute and Rollins83 were determinative:
Clearly, local government bodies . . . have been denied the power 
to adopt local ordinances independently regulating or permitting 
or prohibiting the disposal of oil field waste, both hazardous and 
nonhazardous. The state agencies have exclusive jurisdiction, 
control and authority over the handling, storage and disposal of 
such materials.84
On appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal first reviewed the 
criteria for finding preemption. Under Palermo Land Co. v. Planning 
Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish,85 absent an express provision mandating 
preemption, courts “determine the legislative intent [to preempt or not 
                                                                                                            
81. Desormeaux Enterprises, Inc. v. Village of Mermentau, 568 So. 2d 213 
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1990). 
82. Id. at 214.
83. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 
So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979). See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
84. Desormeaux, 568 So. 2d at 214 (quoting district court’s reasons for 
judgment).
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482 (La. 1990).
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preempt] by examining the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme, 
the need for state uniformity, and the danger of conflict between the 
enforcement of local laws and the administration of the state program.”86
The Third Circuit was satisfied that these criteria were met. Section 1(D)
of Title 30 of the Revised Statutes states that “[t]he disposal of any waste 
product into the subsurface by means of a disposal well . . . shall be within 
the jurisdiction of the department.”87 Later in the statute, the legislature 
specifically requires the Commissioner of Conservation to promulgate 
regulations specifying the “criteria for the location, design and operation 
of commercial offsite disposal facilities.”88 In language that could easily 
be applied to the regulation of drilling oil and gas wells in Louisiana, the 
Third Circuit, affirming the district court, concluded:
[T]he regulation of the disposal of any waste product into the 
subsurface by means of a disposal well, including siting, is within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Conservation. The 
express terms of our pertinent statutory law and the regulations 
adopted pursuant thereto are pervasive and clearly manifest a 
legislative intention to preempt such field in its entirety.89
3. Energy Management: City Ordinances
In 2005, in Energy Management Corp. v. City of Shreveport, the United 
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an ordinance enacted by 
the City of Shreveport.90 The ordinance forbade any new oil and gas 
drilling within 1,000 feet of Cross Lake, the city’s water supply and, in 
addition, “set[] up a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing all new 
drilling between 1,000 and 5,000 feet of Cross Lake.”91 The plaintiff, an 
oil and gas exploration company, had acquired several mineral leases from 
the state covering the lake’s water bottoms and surrounding areas. The 
company attempted to negotiate a variance from the ordinance so it could 
drill within the 1,000-foot zone, but the city refused.92 The company then 
sued in federal court. 
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87. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:1(D) (emphasis added).
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89. Desormeaux, 568 So. 2d at 215 (emphasis in original).
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The company argued that Shreveport was preempted from attempting 
to regulate drilling operations around Cross Lake and also advanced 
several other arguments. The company claimed that if Shreveport did have 
regulatory authority, it had not been reasonably exercised in the ordinance 
and that even if the authority had been reasonably exercised, it amounted 
to a taking in violation of the company’s equal protection and due process 
rights under both the Louisiana and the United States constitutions.93 The 
district court held that Shreveport did have authority to adopt ordinances 
designed to protect its water supply, that its prohibition against drilling 
within 1,000 feet of Cross Lake was a reasonable exercise of that authority, 
and that the company’s taking claim was time-barred.94
On appeal, after first disposing of Shreveport’s challenge to the oil 
company’s standing, the Fifth Circuit addressed the company’s argument 
that Louisiana had preempted the field of oil and gas drilling. Referring to 
the Palermo95 three-part test for determining preemption in the absence of 
an express mandate—the pervasiveness of the state’s regulatory scheme, 
the need for uniformity, and the danger of conflict between the state 
program and local laws—the court held that Louisiana had preempted the 
field.96
The court found that Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes and 
Statewide Order 29-B were “clearly pervasive, addressing every phase of 
the oil and gas exploration process from exploration and prospecting to 
clean-up of abandoned oil field waste sites.”97 Likewise, according to the 
Fifth Circuit, “[t]he statute itself reflects a desire for state uniformity and 
addresses the danger of conflict between the state program and
enforcement of local laws.”98 On this last point, the Fifth Circuit quoted 
subsection 28(F) of Title 30, and concluded:
These statutory provisions make it clear that the process of 
regulating when and where an oil and gas well may be drilled 
within the state is entirely vested in the [Louisiana Office of 
Conservation] and interference by other political bodies is 
prohibited. . . .
As a practical matter, if Ordinance 221 is enforced, this nullifies 
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95. Palermo, 561 So. 2d at 497; see also Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 
549 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1989).
96. Energy Management, 397 F.3d at 303.
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the [Louisiana Office of Conservation’s] authority to exercise its 
discretion to grant or deny a drilling permit at [the] proposed drill 
site. In these circumstances, the local ordinance must yield to 
comprehensive state regulation.99
Shreveport argued that Rollins100 and its progeny were not authority for 
preemption of its ordinance because, unlike Iberville Parish in Rollins,
Shreveport had a home rule charter. The Fifth Circuit was able to avoid 
this issue by pointing out that the source of Shreveport’s authority to 
legislate around the 1,000-foot restricted zone was not its charter, but 
rather a grant of limited police power by the state legislature in 1926. The 
Fifth Circuit “conclude[d] that . . . Ordinance 221 [was] preempted by state 
law and [was] invalid to the extent it purport[ed] to prohibit the drilling of
oil and gas wells in . . . Louisiana, an authority granted exclusively by state 
statute and regulations to the Louisiana Office of Conservation.”101 The 
Fifth Circuit accordingly remanded the case to the district court for the 
entry of a declaratory judgment in conformity with the Fifth Circuit’s 
reversal.102
On remand, however, the district court did not hold that Shreveport’s 
ordinance was preempted. Instead, the court ruled only that the ordinance 
was invalid “to the extent that it purports to prohibit the drilling of oil and 
gas wells in an area within the state of Louisiana.”103 This was an 
important distinction, which led to further disagreement and another trip 
to the Fifth Circuit:
[The oil company] is concerned that this overly narrow language 
could lead to the enforcement of provisions that do not prohibit 
drilling but, nevertheless, restrict related activities because the 
present judgment implies that Shreveport retains the ability to 
enforce costly and unnecessary requirements not required by 
Louisiana for the drilling of oil and gas wells within the State. In 
contrast, Shreveport argues that the only right exclusively 
statutorily reserved to the [Office of Conservation] is the oversight 
of drilling and, therefore, Ordinance 221 is not invalid in its 
additional respects; it asserts that the district court tracked the 
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limiting language of this court’s Energy Management I decision.104
The Fifth Circuit, reversing, held that the district court’s declaratory 
judgment did not comply with the Energy Management I panel’s holding 
that the ordinance was preempted in its entirety.105 That earlier opinion 
was unmistakably clear on the point,106 and was supported by the language 
of the statute itself, case law upholding the “far-reaching” authority of the 
Office of Conservation, and opinions by the Louisiana Attorney General.107
This reversal of the portion of the district court’s opinion dealing with 
declaratory relief was cold comfort to the oil company, however, because 
the Fifth Circuit went on to affirm the remainder of the district court’s 
ruling, which denied damages. The district court had denied the damage 
claims on the grounds that the minerals the oil company had hoped to 
extract (i) had never been owned by the company pursuant to Louisiana’s 
fugacious minerals doctrine, because they had never been reduced to 
possession, and (ii) remained in place, still subject to capture, and so had 
not been “lost.”108
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court was right for the wrong 
reason. The oil company had lost an asset—not the minerals themselves, but 
the mineral leases—but its action for damages, as a taking claim, was 
subject to a three-year prescriptive period (statute of limitation): “Actions 
for compensation for property taken by the state, a parish, municipality or 
other political subdivision . . . shall prescribe three years from the date of 
such taking.”109 Shreveport had enacted the ordinance in 1990, but the oil 
company had not filed suit until 1997, well beyond the prescriptive 
period.110
The Fifth Circuit also addressed an alternative damages theory: a 
substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides a 
civil remedy in federal court for violations, under color of state law, of 
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and laws. In order to 
prevail on this claim the oil company would have to prove both (i) that it 
had a property interest entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection, 
which the Fifth Circuit assumed the oil company could prove, and (ii) that 
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the ultimately struck-down ordinance was not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest, which the Fifth Circuit held the company 
could not prove:
[T]he enactment of Ordinance 221 was rationally related to 
Shreveport’s interest in protecting its water supply. The state of 
Louisiana gave Shreveport the authority in Act 31 of 1910 to adopt 
ordinances to protect its water supply . . . . The fact that the ordinance 
is deemed preempted by state law does not convert Shreveport’s 
actions into a violation of [the oil company’s] due process rights.111
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the oil 
company’s “prevailing party” attorney’s fee claim under 42 U.S.C. 1988, 
because the oil company had not prevailed on its damages claim, and 
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of an award of 
costs, which the district court had not mentioned in its judgment.112
4. Welsh: Parish Ordinances
St. Tammany Parish has a home rule charter that it adopted in 1998, 
twenty-four years after the enactment of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. 
Therefore, its powers of self-rule extend only to those matters not 
prohibited by the constitution or state statutes.113 This limitation on the 
parish’s powers was decisive in a recent case, in which the parish 
unsuccessfully sought a declaratory judgment that its zoning designation 
of an area where the Commissioner of Conservation had issued a drilling 
permit rendered drilling pursuant to the permit illegal. In St. Tammany 
Parish Gov’t v. Welsh, the Commissioner had issued a unitization order in 
the Lacombe Bayou Field located in St. Tammany Parish, and had issued 
a permit to Helis Oil & Gas Company (“Helis”) for the drilling of the unit 
well.114 Although the drill site was in an uninhabited area, its location was 
bound to cause controversy:
The proposed well is located in a wholly residential area designated 
as “A-3 Suburban District” on the St. Tammany Parish zoning map 
and sited over and through the Southern Hills Aquifer, the sole 
source of drinking water in the area. No structures are situated 
within a one-mile radius of the proposed drilling site, and the 
                                                                                                            
111. Id. at 481-82.
112. Id. at 483-84.
113. See discussion supra Section III(A).
114. St. Tammany Parish Gov’t v. Welsh, 199 So. 3d 3 (La. App. 1st Cir.), 
writ denied, 194 So. 3d 1108 (La. 2016).
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property has been a pine tree farm for at least the past thirty years.115
The parish sued James H. Welsh, the Commissioner of Conservation, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the drilling permit was illegal under 
the parish’s zoning ordinance. A citizens’ group intervened in support of 
the parish, and Helis intervened on behalf of the Commissioner. All parties 
filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of 
Helis, declaring that the parish’s zoning ordinances were preempted by 
“general state law and, therefore, unconstitutional,” and in favor of the 
Commissioner, declaring that the Office of Conservation had complied 
with state law in connection with the drilling permit.116
On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal first invoked 
Article IX, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution, which requires that the 
legislature protect Louisiana’s natural resources, and commented that, in 
compliance with the constitutional mandate, “[t]he Legislature has created 
an extensive body of law that addresses every phase of the oil and gas 
exploration process, from the initial exploration and drilling phases to 
clean-up and disposal of waste.”117 The court then quoted La. Rev. Stat.
section 30:28(F), and stated that “St. Tammany Parish’s zoning ordinances 
must yield” based on that language, which “clearly and manifestly evinces 
the legislative intent to expressly preempt that area of the law.”118
According to the court, the parish’s home rule charter was trumped not 
only by the state constitution, but also by statutes such as La. Rev. Stat.
section 30:28(F). The court concluded that Commissioner Welsh, as 
required by La. Rev. Stat. section 33:109.1, had indeed given due 
consideration to the parish’s ordinances that zoned the drill site area 
residential, prior to issuing the drilling permit. The trial court’s ruling was 
affirmed in all respects.119
                                                                                                            
115. Id. at 5. The First Circuit noted that “the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency designated the Southern Hills Aquifer as the sole source of 
drinking water for the area of the proposed well.” Id. at 5, n.2.
116. Id. at 5-6. 
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. at 11. For Helis, all of this was for naught. On September 20, 2016 the 
company announced that it would not proceed with a second phase involving 
hydraulic fracturing, having “determined that the prospect lacks appropriate 
commercial viability. . . . Helis intends to permanently abandon the well and 
secure the site in accordance with regulatory requirements and its leases.” Robert 
Rhoden, Helis Oil Abandons Fracking Project in St. Tammany Parish, THE 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/7TES-XFDL.
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CONCLUSION
City of New Orleans and Traver appear to be the only chinks in the 
Commissioner’s armor of preemption. But the special circumstances of 
those cases—in City of New Orleans, a pre-1974 home rule charter city’s 
regulation of purely local matters; in Traver, some shared jurisdiction with 
the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries over the drill site—diminish any 
threat they pose to the Commissioner’s powers. Ultimately the 
Commissioner’s authority is grounded in the strongly-worded admonition 
to agencies and political subdivisions in La. Rev. Stat. section 30:28(F), 
which clearly indicates the legislature’s intent to preempt regulation of oil 
and gas drilling in Louisiana. The prudent safety restrictions imposed by 
the district court in Traver do counsel the Commissioner to proceed 
carefully when permitting drilling in populated areas or near highways. 
